










 AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT POLICY INITIATIVES
IN ZAMBIA’S COTTON SECTOR
Ballard Zulu and David Tschirley
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: Zambia’s
cotton sector has recently been hailed as a
“remarkable success” in many ways (Boughton, et
al. 2003; Tschirley and Zulu 2003a; Tschirley and
Zulu 2003b).  While the sector continues to face
major challenges to raise quality and productivity
and thus improve its competitiveness in world
markets, cotton production has grown by about 15%
per year since 1999, and exports of cotton and
textiles are first among agricultural exports in value
(Export Board of Zambia, 2001).  The two closest
competitors to cotton during this time – fresh
flowers and sugar – are  primarily produced,
respectively, by larger commercial farmers and
plantations.  Cotton is almost entirely a smallholder
crop, and is arguably the most important source of
cash income for the entire smallholder sector.
The sector has undergone substantial structural
change since 1994: the largest firm, Lonrho Cotton,
was sold to Dunavant Zambia Ltd in 1999, three- to
four new companies have entered the sector, and at
least one has exited.  In addition, government over
the past two years has made its first forays into
proactive policy to promote the sector.  In this paper
we assess three of these policy initiatives:  input
credit provision for smallholder producers of
selected cash crops including cotton, the proposed
creation of a Cotton Board, and the emergence in
2003 of District Council levies as a point of conflict
between local governments and cotton companies.
The purpose of the paper is to provide guidance to
public and private decision makers regarding key
modifications which may need to be made to these
policies to ensure continued healthy development of
the sector.
THE COTTON OUTGROWER FUND:  In
January 2002, Zambia elected a new President who
appeared to favor a more activist policy with regard
to agriculture. Around the same time the Cotton
Ginners’ Association was spearheading a proposal to
promote “food security through cotton”.  The main
provision of the proposal was that government
would provide loans of around US$2,000,000 to
ginning companies which would be on-lent to
outgrowers, with the package being a blend of cotton
and maize inputs. During the President’s inaugural
speech at parliament he revealed that the government
intended to establish a scheme to provide funds for
on-lending to farmers for various crops, not just
cotton. 
Objectives and Operation of the Scheme:  The main
objective of the new initiative was to increase the
number of farmers growing cash crops by increasing
the amount of money available to finance inputs.
According to CDT, an additional objective of the
cotton scheme was to reduce “pirate buying”. Also
called “side-selling” or “strategic default” by
farmers, this involves farmers receiving input credit
from one company but selling the cotton to another
company and neglecting to repay the loan.  Such
behavior typically involves collaboration of both the
farmer and the “pirate” buyer.  The logic behind the
input credit scheme was that if firms received low
cost funds from government to lend out to farmers,
and if they understood that these funds could be
terminated if they did not play by the rules, they
would be less tempted to pirate buy and would
instead focus on building effective relationships with
farmers and recovering their loans.  Such logic might
be most applicable to small firms with credit
constraints for whom this program makes a non-
marginal difference in their ability to engage with
smallholders.
The total amount for the scheme was originally
ZK15 billion (about US$3.5 million) of which the
cotton sector was to receive ZK3.5 billion (about
US$800,000). Government identified the Cotton
Development Trust as the vehicle to deliver thesePage 2
funds.  Several discussions were held between CDT
and the Zambia Cotton Ginners’ Association. The
initial idea was to on-lend these funds to all the
Ginners at an interest rate of between 13% and 15%.
In the end the available








Clark Cotton, the second largest cotton company in
Zambia, was excluded because its location, Eastern
province, was not in the pilot scheme in 2002.
Government signed a contract with CDT stipulating
that the funds would be lent to CDT at 8% annual
interest. Twenty percent of the total amount was a
grant to CDT for mobilization but the CDT board
resolved that all the funds should be on-lent to the
participating ginners.
Government released
ZK450m in a first tranche
in August 2002. The next
tranche of  ZK650 million
was released in December
2002. No further funds
were released which meant that only ZK1.1b of the
planned ZK3.5b had been released.  Dunavant
received close to ZK1 billion while Continental
Ginneries received the balance. CDT reports that
payments are on schedule and that the last payment
is expected in January, 2004.
The late disbursement of these funds reduced the
effectiveness of the scheme. The amount released is
also small, representing about 5% of Dunavant’s
lending during the 2002/03 season.
CDT planned for a scheme of ZK2.2b for the
2003/04 agricultural season that would include all
ginning firms.  MACO reports that the Cotton
Growers Association applied to be the host of the
funds but did not provide the needed documentation.
CDT thus continues to be the host of the funds in the
2004 season. As of January 2004, close to
ZK1 billion has been raised for the scheme and has
been transferred. The balance is to come from the
recoveries of the ZK1.1 billion from last year.
Key Issues:  To date the scheme has avoided the
error of centralizing input procurement and
distribution to farmers within itself.  By channeling
credit to private cotton companies already working
with farmers and allowing them full freedom on how
to use it, the scheme essentially becomes a means to
increase lendable funds in the system and reduce
borrowing costs for the
companies. 
A more important potential
benefit of the scheme may
be in helping smaller firms
remain in the market while
giving them a vested
interest in playing by the
rules.  A major risk in allowing new, often small
entrants into the cotton sector is that they may have
little long-term investment in the sector and may,
together, create major credit repayment problems
that undermine the entire enterprise.  At the same
time, some level of workable competition is needed
to stimulate private institutional innovations that
improve quality and productivity while sharing
profits equitably and sustainably with farmers
(Tschirley et al., 2003).
Thus, it would be a major
policy success if the Cotton
Outgrower Credit Scheme
helps smaller firms remain
in the market while
providing input credit and
not engaging in pirate buying.  As a condition of
participating in the loan program a Ginner could be
required to maintain open records of loans to
growers and their repayment.
The scheme would benefit from clarification of at
least three key questions. First, what precisely is its
purpose?  Purposes which have been mentioned by
players are increasing lendable funds in the sector,
reducing borrowing costs for cotton companies, and
reducing pirate buying.  An additional original
intention was to use 20% of the fund’s assets to
capitalize CDT, this objective was dropped during
the first year.  We have suggested that an important
benefit relates to the effect of the scheme on the
structure of the industry at the ginner/first buyer
level.  CDT, the cotton companies, and MACO
would be well served by clarifying and prioritizing
precisely what the objectives of the scheme are.
Second, will the scheme be financed with a
revolving fund, or will it rely on new appropriations
every year?  A revolving fund would provide much
greater stability for the Scheme, as long as the
resources were managed properly and transparently.
If such management cannot be reasonably assured,
A potential benefit of the credit scheme may be
helping smaller firms remain in the market
while giving them a vested interest in “playing
by the rules” and not engaging in pirate buying. 
This would be a major policy success
It is critically important that the program not be
turned into a credit “give away”.  Thus, one key
criterion for eligibility must be the ability of the
firm to repay the loan.  Page 3
then recurring appropriations are probably the best
funding option.  Yet such a design leaves the scheme
vulnerable to political and budgetary changes, and
for that reason would probably undermine strong
commitment by key players in the sector.  To date,
the scheme has not been managed as a revolving
fund:  CDT was required to fully repay the ZK1.1b
after the first year and receive a new appropriation of
ZK2.2b.  Its important that a strong and transparent
management structure be put in place so that the
scheme can begin operating as a revolving fund.
Finally, what criteria should be used in deciding
each firm’s eligibility and share of the financial
resources?  It is critically important that the program
not be turned into a credit “give away”.  Thus, one
key criterion for eligibility must be the ability of the
firm to repay the loan.  This will depend upon the
ginner’s ability to set up a lending organization of
agents with knowledge of growers and their ability
and inclination to repay loans, and an incentive for
the agents to get the repayments.  This implies that
CDT must make some impartial assessment, based
on criteria agreed to by the Ginners’ Association, of
the effectiveness of a company’s input credit
disbursement and collection system prior to granting
eligibility.  If needed, technical assistance could be
provided to assist the firm improve its system and
meet eligibility requirements.  Once eligibility is
granted, each company’s share of the resources
should also be based on transparent criteria agreed to
by CDT and the Ginners’ Association.  During the
program’s first year, Dunavant received nearly 90%
of all funds.  It is likely that with the new funding of
ZK2.2b and presumed entrance of Clark and other
companies, Dunavant’s share will fall substantially.
THE PROPOSED COTTON ACT:  Beginning as
early as 2000, CDT and other stakeholders started
developing a regulatory framework to allow the
orderly development of the sector over time.  A key
concern which drove this process was avoiding a
repeat of the credit default
crisis that nearly destroyed
the sector from 1997
through 1999.  The
proposed Cotton Act
emerged in this context.  
Basic Provisions of the Act:  The proposed Act
establishes a Cotton Board with nine voting
members, appointed by the Minister of MACO upon
nomination by their own institution.  Members are
the PS of MACO, two persons each from CDT, the
Cotton Ginners’ Association, and the Cotton
Growers’ Association, the Controller of Seeds (one
person), and one person from the Environmental
Council of Zambia.  The Board would have no
authority to set prices nor to directly engage in
marketing behavior.  Rather, its stated functions are
regulatory and advisory.  Specific stated functions of
the Board are to:
a.  Regulate the production, processing, and
marketing of cotton,
b.  Advise government on regulations and policies
related to the sector,
c.  Monitor and report on implementation of policies
and matters related to the sector, and
d.  “Carry out such activities as are necessary ... to
the better performance of its functions”
Key sections of the proposed Act are on licensing
(III.15) and registration (IV).  The Board will have
a Cotton Licensing Committee of not more than
seven members.  Functions of the Licensing
Committee are to issue certificates and licenses,
approve  “distinguishing marks” (company
trademarks), and maintain data bases on land planted
with cotton, registered cotton growers, and
distinguishing marks.  The Act stipulates that “any
person dealing in cotton” must be registered and pay
a registration fee, and that any cotton leaving a
registered ginner must have the distinguishing mark
clearly shown (subsection 30.1).  Licensing is
specified for cotton ginners, cotton seed sellers,
cotton seed producers, Inspectors, and “any other
license which the Board may prescribe”
The Board may refuse to register a person “giving
reasons in writing” if it is “satisfied that the
applicant or a person employed by the applicant
does not have sufficient knowledge or experience in
the cotton trade” (emphasis added, VI.33.3).  No
criteria are provided as a basis for making such a
judgement.  All licence holders must maintain
records on cotton transactions, which “shall be open
to inspection at all
reasonable times, by the
Board ...” (VI.35).  Once
granted, registrations can
be cancelled by the Board
for, among other reasons,
buying pre-financed cotton without authorization
from the financier, engaging in “pirate buying”
1, or
1  “Pirate buying” is not defined in the Act, and the
difference between it and “buying pre-financed cotton
without authorization from the financier” is not clear.
The proposed Cotton Act focuses on two issues
of great importance: credit repayment and
product quality.Page 4
engaging in “any other activity not registered with
the Board”.  
Cotton Board Inspectors powers include:  
1.  Enter and search any premise and seize and
remove any cotton based on “reasonable cause”
2.  Stop, search, and detain any vehicle based on
“reason to believe ...”
3.  Inspect all records related to cotton
4.  Arrest and detain based on reasonable suspicion.
5.  Seize machinery or material if he believes an
offense has been committed or is likely to be
committed (emphasis added; section 44.1.c)
The Act appears to prohibit
appeal of Board decisions to
Courts.  The appeals
procedure is first to the
Board, then to the Minister.
(IV.22.2 and VI.37.4).
The Act allows the Board to raise funds through
Parliamentary appropriations, fees, grants,
donations, and loans, and stipulates the
establishment of a Cotton Development Trust Fund
to finance technical activities (VII.39).
Assessment 
2:  The proposed Cotton Act focuses on
two issues of great importance to any export industry
engaging in contract farming with smallholder
farmers: credit repayment and product quality.  Each
of these aspects can be negatively affected when
large numbers of cotton buyers operate in the sector,
especially if some do not have long-term
commitments to the sector.  Buyers who do not
provide input credit to farmers can offer more
attractive prices and thus
promote strategic default.
These same buyers are not
likely to pay attention to the
careful post-harvest
practices needed to ensure
high quality cotton for
export, nor are they likely to abide by the
agreements nor support the long-term efforts needed
to increase productivity in the sector.
3  
Viewed in this context, efforts to impose some
control over who can operate in a cotton sector are
understandable.  Yet it must also be recognized, first,
that abuses can be committed by established players
who have accumulated  too much power and may
over time come to favor short-term profits over long-
term development.  Second, as argued in the
previous section, some level of competition is
necessary to promote private innovation to ensure
efficiency and equity so that smallholder farmers
engaged in the activity can earn sustained profits and
escape poverty.  Finally, regulation has costs as well
as benefits, and a successful industry will keep its
eye on reducing the costs of – and need for – formal




the much larger industrial
buyers.  The challenge, then, is to devise a
regulatory approach that is workable, that has
sufficient “teeth” to impose effective penalties but
does so only when strictly needed, that is balanced
enough to avoid capture by large established players,
and that builds trust among players over time.
From this perspective, the heavy regulatory approach
embodied in the Act provides reason for serious
concern.  The Act grants very broad policing powers
to the Board, essentially creating a parallel police
force, uses vague language in specifying the
conditions under which these powers can be
exercised, and attempts to insulate decisions of the
Board from judicial review.  It also transfers powers
and responsibilities reasonably within the mandate




that the Board’s powers
could be abused, especially
if the sector becomes more
concentrated than it
already is.  The membership of the Board appears
balanced, and its size – nine members – is large
enough that attaining a majority for hard line
positions may be difficult.  Yet a quorum is only six,
and it is impossible to predict how shifting alliances
and power balances may play themselves out in any
given vote.
The tone of the Act and the powers proposed for the
Board and its Inspectors suggest that its design has
been heavily influenced by a vision of the sector that
emphasizes regulation and mandated orderly
2  The proposed Cotton Act is a legal document and as
such requires legal expertise for a full assessment. Here
we raise key issues from a public policy standpoint.  
3  These efforts can include varietal zoning agreements,
collective action to avoid contamination of cotton with
synthetic fibers, voluntary levies, and investments in
farmer training. 
A successful industry will work to reduce the
costs of – and need for – formal regulation by
investing in relationships that increase trust.
We suggest that the public good would be better
served by approaches that rely less on policing
powers and focus on root causes of the sector’s
difficulties.Page 5
processes at the potential expense of competition and
innovation.  Given that the sector has emerged from
the crisis of the 1990s due in large measure to the
institutional innovations and improved management
that emerged from competition between the two
major players, one might ask why such an approach
is needed now.  More specifically, one should ask
three questions.  First, will it be possible to
implement such an approach in Zambia, or will the
regulatory and policing burden be more than the
Board can handle?  Second, even if it is possible to
implement, will this approach be in the best interests
of the cotton sector and the broader society?  Finally,
are there other approaches that may be less intrusive
and more effective?
Definitive answers to the first two questions are
beyond the scope of this paper.  We suggest,
however, that the regulations may be very costly to
apply in practice and hold the possibility of serious
abuse if they are effectively applied.  In short, we
suggest that the public good would be better served
by alternative approaches that rely less on policing
powers and focus on root causes of the sector’s
difficulties.
Alternative Approaches:  The proposed Act is
missing any serious treatment of the problems of
information and collective action to improve credit
repayment, quality, and productivity
4.  The credit
repayment problem is in large part a problem of the
cost of information regarding the credit worthiness
of farmers.  Collective action – some voluntary but
some likely requiring legal sanction – is needed to
resolving this problem, and is also necessary to
conceive, finance, and ensure adherence to
procedures and programs to improve quality and
productivity at the farm and ginning levels.  While
the Dunavant Distributor System (and perhaps
Clark’s less well known approach) has been
remarkably successful in this regard, the system
likely remains costly, and apparent credit repayment
rates of 85-90% remain well below what a purely
financial institution would consider acceptable.  
All companies could achieve higher repayment rates
at lower cost if the sector were able to operate an
effective credit bureau – a clearing-house for
information on the credit status of borrowers.  Credit
bureaus can range from voluntary sharing of
information among firms to legally mandated
reporting and public availability of information on
delinquencies and defaults. While the institutional
and legal challenges of establishing a workable
credit bureau are substantial, such an approach holds
the prospect of providing a lower cost solution to the
credit repayment problem than does a heavy
regulatory approach as embodied in the proposed
Act.  The Cotton Ginners’ Association, which has
the greatest incentive to reduce credit default, should
work together with CDT and other organizations
(MACO, ZNFU) to propose a workable framework
for improving credit information in the sector. The
proposal should include strengthening of CDT and
legal changes, if any, deemed necessary to achieve
the goal of low-cost availability of information on
the credit worthiness of potential borrowers.  
The Act stipulates the creation of a Cotton
Development Trust Fund for technical activities,
which is a positive step.  This section would be
strengthened if specific mechanisms were proposed
to generate funds from within the sector to finance
quality- and productivity improvement programs,
e.g., ginning or export levies.  
Well functioning commodity sectors have the ability
to generate regular and reliable information about
key aspects of sector performance beyond credit
histories of borrowers.  Examples of such
information include costs of production and
profitability of the crop relative to alternatives in
production, an assessment of key bottlenecks that
increase costs and reduce profitability, international
price levels and forecasts, trends in input use and
yields relative to neighboring countries, number of
producers, and total production.  This type of
information is currently very difficult to obtain.
Providing it in a reliable fashion requires
collaboration between public and private sectors.
The Act should include a proposal for the
institutional home and operational mechanisms to
provide such information.
In summary, this review suggests the following.
First, bringing together formally a broad set of
stakeholders in the cotton sector to grapple with key
development issues has great merit.  Properly
focused, such a group could play a central role
mobilizing resources and political will to make the
long-term investments in productivity and quality
that are crucial for the sector’s continued success.
Second, the current heavy policing focus of the
proposed Cotton Act is inappropriate.  If approved in
4  The Act does mandate that the Board shall maintain
data bases on land planted with cotton and registered
cotton growers, among other items.  Yet it does not tie
this function into efforts to address credit repayment
problems.  Page 6
its current form, the Act would create a potentially
powerful institution with vaguely defined limits on
those powers, relatively little political oversight, and
no judicial oversight.  The probability of abuse in the
Zambian context is prohibitively high.  Third, if
sector leaders remain committed to the creation of a
Cotton Board, its policing powers should be reduced
substantially, and the Act should specify much more
clearly under what conditions any remaining
policing powers can be used.  Fourth, the sector
needs seriously to deal with at least three issues that
are either ignored or treated very briefly in the
proposed Act.  The sector needs to a) develop legal
bases and operational approaches to improve
information on borrowers’ credit history, b) promote
collective action for procedures and programs to
improve quality and productivity, and c) propose a
specific institutional home and operational
mechanisms to improve the monitoring of sector
performance beyond credit repayment.  For the
Cotton Act to make a positive contribution to the
development of the sector, it needs to re-conceive
the Cotton Board to focus on these issues and greatly
reduce its policing emphasis.
DISTRICT COUNCIL LEVIES:  The levying of
fees on crops traded within a district or across its
borders became a point of intense conflict between
some local governments and cotton companies in
early 2003 when it came to light that Chadiza
District in Eastern Province had raised its levy on
cotton from ZK5/kg to ZK100/kg.  The ensuing
negotiations between cotton companies and Chadiza,
and reactions by some other Districts, have raised
important issues about mechanisms of public finance
at the local level and impacts on economic activity
and smallholder farmer incomes.
Operation of the Levies:  According to the Ministry
of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), district
councils in Zambia have for many years had the
power to set levies on the sale or transport of
agricultural produce.  This power was made more
explicit in the Local Government Act of 1991.
Under the new government which passed this act,
funding levels from central government to local
councils declined, meaning that Councils felt greater
need to raise funds.  Given the lack of non-farm
economic development in rural areas, agricultural
produce levies have been their primary tool.
The interpretation of the agricultural levies by
councils in Zambia is that they are charged on
agricultural produce grown in , sold in, or
transported out of the district.  Prior to the 2003
marketing season, levies on cotton were uniform
across districts at ZK5/kg, though it is not clear that
all districts collected the levies on all marketed
crops.  In January 2002, Chadiza District gained
approval from MLGH for Statutory Instrument No.
6 of 2002, in which it established new levies for
maize, paprika, cassava and potatoes (grouped
together), cotton, tobacco, tomato, cabbage, and
watermelon.  The value of the levy per kilogram
varied widely.  For cotton, it was set at ZK100/kg,
higher than for any crop except tobacco, which was
set at ZK300/kg.  
Local businesses appear to have been unaware of the
new levy schedule at the time it was passed, and the
Chadiza District Council provided businesses with
demand notices only in November 2002 (after the
close of the marketing season) regarding the total
value of 2002 levies due.  In February 2003, an ad
hoc group composed of representatives of Clark
Cotton, Dunavant, Stancom (tobacco), Dimon
Zambia (tobacco), and a local petrol filling station
formally requested that the District Council
reconsider the levies.  The cotton and tobacco
companies emphasized that they would reduce the
price they pay to farmers by the amount of the levy.
In April, the Council reduced levies on cotton to
ZK40/kg, and to ZK70/kg for tobacco.  Levies on
other crops remained unchanged except for maize,
whose levy was raised from ZK300 per 50 kg bag to
ZK3,000.  It remains unclear whether businesses
were obliged to pay the full value of the originally
assessed 2002 levies.
Interviews with Dunavant and MLGH officials
indicate that other districts are charging levies of
ZK10/kg, 1% of the anticipated price of cotton at the
time they were set.  However, interviews with
MLGH reveal that Katete District Council gained
approval in June, 2003 to raise the cotton levy to
ZK200/kg for cotton seed and ZK100 for raw cotton.
These new rates will not take effect until the by-laws
are printed and circulated by the Government
Printing Office. As of September 2003 there were no
other pending by-laws on cotton or other crops.  
Assuming that the Katete levy of ZK100/kg remains
in place, potential revenue from Dunavant and Clark
in Eastern Province is about US$600,000, primarily
from Katete and Chadiza.  These are substantial
sums of money for District Councils.  
Key Issues:  These events raise several issues.  The
first regards the way in which the levies were
passed.  District Councils are required by law to postPage 7
proposed bills on a notice board for three months,
and to take comments during that time.  Companies
indicated that this procedure had not been followed;
the fact that they raised no protests until 13 months
after the final printing of the Chadiza statute seems
to support their contention.  MLGH reports that in
their view all
procedures required to




While full clarity on
what procedures were followed may never be
attained, it seems clear that local governments have
incentives to be less than transparent when
proposing such actions, due to the economic power
wielded by large agro-industrial companies in poor
rural areas.  It is telling that Chadiza levies were
reduced by 60% for cotton and 77% for tobacco,
while they were raised by a factor of 10 on maize;
the latter is traded primarily by small traders with
little ability to make their voice heard in
government.  From the Council’s perspective,
however, maize is a less attractive crop to levy,
because only a portion of it is marketed, and
collection of the levy requires them to deal with
large numbers of traders rather than one or two.
What options are open to District Councils to raise
funds for key public sector activities?  
This paper will not answer
that question; simply
raising it should make the
point that it is in the
interests of agro-industrial
companies to work with local governments on this
issue, demonstrate their appreciation for the
Councils’ quandary, and agree to pay reasonable
levies.  At least some players indicate that they are
doing this.  At the same time, District councils need
to understand the longer term consequences of their
taxing policies.  Almost all governments in the rest
of the world avoid taxing exports and often subsidize
them. Their objective is to be more competitive in
world markets and promote economic activity.
Since the price of cotton in world markets is not
influenced by the small quantities marketed by
Zambia, the ginners cannot pass the tax on to buyers
in the world market.  Most of the tax will fall on the
growers.  At some level of taxation growers will
reduce the production of cotton. Migration of cotton
production is likely from districts with high taxes to
those with low taxes, and from districts with
comparative advantage in cotton into those with less
comparative advantage. 
The use of the taxes will also influence the outcome.
If tax funds are used to reduce costs of delivering
cotton, the negative effect of the tax will be
mitigated. Examples include
improved roads, greater
security, or improvement in the
enforcement of contracts. The
point is that taxation policy is
complex, suggesting that
government and donors should
consider technical assistance to
local councils to grapple with this issue.
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to work with local governments on this issue ...
At the same time, District councils need to
understand the longer term consequences of
their taxing policies.
Government and donors should consider
technical assistance to local councils to grapple
with this issue.